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Studying the International Crisis Group 
 
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara  
 
[8,898 words] 
 
This special issue studies the International Crisis Group (ICG), one of the most 
notable and widely referenced producers of knowledge about conflict areas used 
extensively by policy-makers, the media and academics. The authors take different 
theoretical and methodological approaches to make sense of this hard-to-ignore 
conflict expert, exploring the ICG‟s daily operations and role in international politics. 
This introduction sets the scene by offering a critical exploration of the organisation 
and its approach to the construction of political knowledge. It analyses the ICG‟s 
position in the conflict-related knowledge market and the sources of its expert 
authority. The article then discusses the organisation‟s roles – from mediation to 
instrumentalisation – in the „battlefield of ideas‟ in conflict and intervention contexts 
and its possibilities for impact on policy framings and outcomes. It shows that studies 
of the ICG need to „unpack‟ the organisation in order to account for it as both a highly 
successful international expert brand and a very heterogeneous actor in specific 
contexts/at specific times. 
 
Keywords: International Crisis Group (ICG); political knowledge; expert authority; 
conflict; intervention; crisis; advocacy; symbolic capital 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This issue of Third World Quarterly is dedicated to the study of one of the most notable and 
widely referenced producers of knowledge about conflict areas used extensively by policy-
makers, the media and academics: the International Crisis Group (ICG). Policy-relevant 
„conflict knowledge‟ is produced and distributed by many actors. These include state 
ministries and (intelligence) agencies, international organisations‟ lessons learnt units, branch 
offices and field missions, fact-finding missions, contracted consultants, NGOs working in 
conflict areas, and traditional and new media, to name just some of the more prominent ones. 
While being just one voice in this mixed choir of conflict-related knowledge producers, the 
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ICG is without question one that has very influential listeners. Founded in 1995 as „an 
independent organisation that would serve as the world‟s eyes and ears on the ground in 
countries in conflict while pressing for immediate action‟1, the ICG is a paramount example 
of a highly visible, vocal, hard-to-ignore conflict expert. 
In a 2013 global think tank ranking, the ICG is sixth among top think tanks in 
Western Europe,
2
 and tenth among non-US think tanks worldwide, with the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (no. 3) and the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (no. 4) being the only war-related think tanks ahead of it.
3
 In the combined list of US 
and non-US top think tanks, the ICG ranks sixteenth, now additionally outranked by the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (no. 3) and the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (no. 15).
4
 
The ICG describes itself on its website as „an independent, non-profit, non-
governmental organisation committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict‟. Currently, 
it is „covering some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict (through analysts operating from 
regional or field bases, or consultants)‟ 5 . In addition to its Brussels headquarters, „the 
organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, 
Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujumbura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala City, 
Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, 
Nairobi, New York, Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, Tripoli, 
Tunis and Washington DC‟ – with Brussels, New York, Washington, London, Moscow and 
Beijing serving as advocacy offices. In total, the ICG employs „[s]ome 130 permanent staff 
worldwide, from 53 nationalities speaking 50 languages‟.6 ICG reports and briefings are 
known to be timely, detailed and useful, and their generally good reputation among the policy 
community is based on their perceived accuracy, insight and objectivity.
7
 ICG reports claim, 
and are perceived, to represent „authentic‟ knowledge about conflicts (cf. Bøås in this issue). 
Or as the ICG words it on its website, the organisation plays a key role by „[p]roviding 
objective analysis and detailed actor mapping unobtainable elsewhere on developments 
regarding conflict, mass violence and terrorism‟. 
The ICG aims at exerting influence on agenda setting, policy-making and policy 
implementation in post-/conflict areas. It does so not only by providing policy-makers with 
information in the form of detailed analyses and early warning alerts and publishing widely 
through traditional and electronic media. Importantly, the organisation lobbies more directly 
for certain agendas and policies. According to its website, it „[c]onducts some 5,000 
advocacy meetings with policymakers and other decision-makers‟ per year.8 In the eyes of 
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peers and experts, the ICG‟s advocacy efforts seem to pay off: the think tank report ranks the 
ICG eighth for best advocacy campaign.
9
 The ICG attributes its influence on policy-makers 
to „key roles being played by senior staff highly experienced in government and by an active 
Board of Trustees‟ 10 , whose composition of former high-level statespersons and other 
influential personalities resembles a „who‟s who of influential power brokers‟ in international 
politics, as a 2005 Time Asia article described it.  
The ICG‟s more general information dissemination strategies and media lobbying 
campaigns aim at raising awareness about emerging wars, on-going conflicts and areas 
forgotten by the „international community‟. Especially in cases where the ICG has been 
among the first vocal experts reporting on a conflict, it is highly plausible that the 
organisation has had some influence on how these conflicts have been labelled and framed 
(see Simons and Bøås in this issue). The ICG claims on its website that every year it 
„[p]ublishes around 90 reports and briefings, containing between them some 800 separate 
policy recommendations‟, with „[o]ver 159,000 people subscribing online to receive reports‟ 
and 132,000 receiving the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin; it „[a]uthors more than 200 opinion 
pieces in major international newspapers, with nearly half in languages other than English‟; 
and it „[g]arners more than 5,000 media mentions in print and electronic media‟. The 
organization is also present on Facebook (nearly 40,000 „likes‟ in March 2014) and Twitter 
(over 70,000 followers). Overall, the ICG‟s media efforts are judged by peers and experts as 
quite successful: among all global think tanks it is ranked twelfth for „best use of social 
networks‟, fourteenth for „best external relations/public engagement programme‟, fifteenth 
for „best use of the media (print or electronic)‟, and twenty-third for „best use of the 
Internet‟.11 
In view of its presence in and possible influence on policy circles, media and 
academia, it is surprising that the ICG has not gained more attention as an object of study.
12
 
Apart from the selected information that the ICG itself provides about its organisational 
development and political role, we know little about how the organisation works. This 
pertains, first, to its daily operations: How is information gathered and interpreted? Who 
takes part and decides in the process from report drafting to final product to policy 
recommendations? And which quality controls exist? Second, we also know very little about 
the ICG‟s role in international politics, about its „impact‟ on political perceptions, processes 
and outcomes: How did the organisation establish (the perception of) itself as a central 
„conflict expert‟ in the field of conflict-related policy knowledge? In how far has ICG-
produced knowledge shaped the perceptions of conflicts and legitimate solutions? Which 
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formal and informal relations exist between ICG experts, local stakeholders and international 
decision-makers? And what role has the organisation (or its representatives) played in 
conflicts and peacebuilding processes? 
The fact that we have only few answers to these questions to date and that academics 
using ICG reports have not even asked them in the first place,
13
 hints at a lack of critical 
engagement with this central actor in the field of conflict-related knowledge production and 
policy-making. Aiming to fill this void, the contributions in this issue are first attempts at 
answering questions and opening up routes for further study. 
 
 
The ICG and the construction of ‘conflict knowledge’  
 
Politically relevant knowledge is understood here as socially constructed in power struggles 
between actors resorting to specific technologies and bound together through the structures of 
the policy field. Politics can thus not be seen as having one specific „reality‟; rather, „[t]he 
reality of politics is a politics with “realities”‟.14 From this perspective, (the construction of) 
knowledge is both object and resource of political power struggles. 
Political struggles over the construction of reality can be observed, on the one hand, 
with regard to descriptive-ontological knowledge about how the world is, was or will be.
15
 
Knowledge about the past interprets bygone political events and experiences and constructs 
causal relationships with the present. In the context of this study, this rather persistent form of 
knowledge concerns, for example, how international policy-makers interpret a conflict area‟s 
colonial past and its meaning for the current situation. The ICG ventured into this type of 
knowledge in 2005 by announcing a new type of publication, the „background report‟, whose 
function would be „scene-setting reports, not focused on detailed recommendations though 
often indicating preferred directions, 10-50 pages as the subject matter demands‟. However, 
not many of these reports have been produced since. The general lack of historical and socio-
economic context analysis is one major critique of the ICG‟s work by the wider academic 
community and many of the authors in this special issue (see especially contributions by 
Bøås, Grigat, Hochmüller and Müller, and Koddenbrock). 
Knowledge about the future revolves around practices like simulations, prognoses, 
risk analyses and probability measurements regarding politically relevant events in the future 
and how they are related to present action. The most obvious example in the present context 
is early warning mechanisms, which assess situations of latent or acute conflict based on 
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qualitative and/or quantitative models of data collection
16
 and analysis and make predictions 
about potential deterioration, stagnation or improvement. The ICG provides such knowledge 
through its CrisisWatch bulletin, a monthly publication giving brief estimations of conflict 
situations, alerting to „conflict risk‟, pointing out „conflict resolution opportunities‟, and 
labelling conflict situations as „improved‟ or „deteriorated‟ (see Kosmatopoulos and Simons 
in this issue). „Conflict risk alerts‟ are a second way in which future-related appraisals of 
political events are delivered, highlighting stirred-up political situations that might lapse into 
more widespread violent conflict. Both CrisisWatch and risk alerts are condensed forms of 
conflict evaluation and offer little or no space for detailed analysis – a problem indeed 
acknowledged by some ICG staff: 
 
In fact, this format is, in my experience, not favorably looked upon by researchers „in 
the field‟, as they give much more value to the detailed, more qualified and less rigid 
perspectives offered in ICG‟s full length reports. For that reason, and when I was 
researcher […], I barely worked on these CrisisWatch reports and merely had a glance 
at them after they were prepared by someone browsing the media in Brussels to make 
sure there wasn‟t anything evidently incorrect.17 
 
Future research should assess how policy-makers and journalists, at which these early 
warning products are aimed, make use of and perceive these brief tendency indicators – i.e. 
whether they are seen merely as „press clippings‟ from a non-profit information provider or 
whether the (perceived) authority of the authoring organisation attaches specific value or 
meaning to these products, and if so, with which effects (see further Kosmatopoulos in this 
issue).
18
 
Knowledge about the present, finally, includes all statements about functional or 
causal relationships, causal determinisms, necessity constructions, interests and expertise 
revolving around a current political issue. How a current situation – in this case, in a violent 
conflict or post-conflict space – is interpreted, determines the repertoire of legitimate action 
and „solutions‟19. While established knowledge about causal relationships, determinisms and 
necessity constructions tends to lead to closure and thus the reduction of alternatives for 
political action, new interpretations, not least through highly regarded expert knowledge, can 
open up space for differing policy options.
20
 ICG reports and briefings as well as op-eds and 
other media pieces authored by ICG representatives are mostly concerned with this sort of 
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knowledge, analysing and giving policy recommendations about immediate political 
situations to which their reporting attaches some urgency (see Simons in this issue). 
The other main instrument and object of knowledge constructions in political 
struggles apart from ontological knowledge is normative-practical knowledge, which 
determines what actors want to do (wishes, interests, passions, preferences etc.), must do 
(imperatives, duties, stringent necessities etc.), or should do (norms, conventions, traditions, 
moral or ethical considerations etc.).
21
 When it comes to the policy recommendations in ICG 
reports, normative-practical knowledge is used to derive prescriptions for concrete political 
action from the conflict analysis. Especially where the connection between a report‟s analysis 
and its policy recommendations is not straightforward, a possible explanation is that 
(implicit) normative-practical knowledge trumped descriptive-ontological interpretation.  
Indeed, it is an oft-heard complaint among academics that ICG policy 
recommendations seem „decoupled‟ from the analytical parts of the reports: while analyses 
account for political paradoxes and dilemmas, the recommendations are rather complexity 
reducing and formulaic. Grigat (in this issue), for instance, shows that in the case of 
Indonesia „the ICG mantra-like recommends measures to reform the security sector, notably 
the police‟, no matter which issue it has been reporting about over the last 15 years. Drawing 
on Foucaultian notions of power/knowledge, Grigat‟s explanation for this finding is that  
 
ICG reporting fulfils a function that transcends the immediate contribution to 
preventing and resolving violent conflicts. ICG publications essentially aim at 
discursively disciplining their audience through practices and procedures 
characteristic of liberal governance into this specific form of social action and 
corresponding mind-sets, thus perpetuating liberalism as the global “regime of 
power”.  
 
In this interpretation of ICG reporting as education, the normative dimension of 
knowledge production clearly outweighs other dimensions. Another explanation for 
disconnects between analysis and policy recommendations lies in the interest of think tanks 
to secure access to and influence on policy-makers, which can only be achieved through 
information and policy advice that is „useful‟ in the eyes of the users. As Fisher (in this issue) 
shows in the case of Uganda, the urge to have „impact‟ may well trump conclusions derived 
from previous analysis, if this helps finding a sympathetic ear among, and access to, policy-
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makers (cf. also Koddenbrock on the DR Congo, and Bliesemann de Guevara for a more 
general discussion, both in this issue). 
 Nullmeier and Rüb have suggested understanding the struggles over these different 
forms of knowledge in the construction of political realities in terms of sectoral „knowledge 
markets‟, in which different suppliers of knowledge compete with each other, sometimes 
forming oligopolies, sometimes even creating a knowledge monopoly.
22
 From such a market 
perspective, politically relevant knowledge production is seen not as „problem-oriented‟ but 
as „success-oriented‟: knowledge „must be “marketable”, that is, it must be able to compete 
with other knowledge stocks. The design, marketing strategies, the knowledge management 
and the emotionality related to the product knowledge play an important role in this.‟23 
Knowledge entrepreneurs are strategic actors in knowledge markets who stand out due to 
their success in acquiring a prominent, influential position. From the ICG‟s (self-)description 
above it can be derived that the organisation has managed to establish itself as such a 
knowledge entrepreneur in the market of conflict/violence-related knowledge. One central 
question is how it has succeeded to do so. 
 
 
Constructing ‘expert authority’: conflict-related knowledge production as social field 
 
The idea of knowledge markets resembles Bourdieu‟s social fields, where actors in different 
social positions and disposing of different sorts and amounts of capital struggle for influence 
according to the field‟s specific rules of the game.24 Capital in Bourdieu‟s sense is not only 
economic or monetary in form; it can also be social (e.g. connections, networks), cultural 
(e.g. education, titles) or symbolic (specifically value-laden forms of the economic, social or 
cultural capital). Being seen as knowledge entrepreneur, that is, as a leading knowledge 
provider in a specific knowledge market, is a manifestation of symbolic capital. The currency 
value and exchange rates of the capital in a social field depend on its specific rules, and while 
it is not impossible for actors to change them in the long run, the normal situation is that both 
access to and accession within a field are very much determined by existing rules. 
The ICG‟s self-description hints at the capital forms with the highest value in the field 
of conflict-related knowledge production: social and, to a lesser extent, cultural capital. While 
the organisation‟s funding base is arguably not negligible with an „annual budget for 2012-
2013 [of] $20.6 million‟ according to its website, it is small when compared, for instance, to 
the research budgets of western governments‟ ministries and agencies. For instance, the 
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British development agency „DfID‟s Research and Evidence Division spends just under 10% 
of its total research expenditure on governance, conflict and social development, and for 
2014/15 this is projected to be around £29 million‟.25 It is thus not the amount of economic 
capital through which the ICG gains its position in the field of conflict knowledge, although 
money is arguably a necessary condition for its activities and fundraising thus a constant 
factor in its daily operations and public relations. 
Critics have argued that it is not the amount but the sources of the ICG‟s funding 
which have opened western policy-makers‟ doors for its advocacy, while at the same time 
(possibly) compromising the ICG‟s political independence. 26  The organisation‟s funding 
„comes from governments (49%), institutional foundations (20%), and individual and 
corporate donors (31%)‟, but as the ICG stresses on its website, „mostly in the welcome form 
of core funding (over 70%) rather than being earmarked for specific programs‟. The 
governmental donors exclusively comprise development agencies and ministries of foreign 
affairs of OECD countries. The list of corporate private sector donors includes big multi-
nationals, business consultancies, legal advisors and investment managers, and among the 
foundations making donations are well-known names such as Carnegie Corporation, George 
Soros‟s Open Society Foundations and Rockefeller Brothers Fund.27 Being a western think 
tank aiming at a western/international policy audience, the funding structure may not come as 
a surprise, however, and the ICG has countered the critique of possible donor influences by 
pointing to the diversity of funding sources and attached interests among western donors, 
which at least contradicts the idea of simple, straightforward connections between donors and 
reporting.
28
 
The most outstanding form of capital valued in the field of conflict-related knowledge 
production, however, is social capital – both with regard to contacts „on the ground‟ in post-
/conflict spaces, which are necessary to gather information, as well as regarding high-level 
contacts in the „highest echelons‟ of decision-making, which ensure the possibility of 
influence and impact. In the ICG‟s narrative, this is what differentiates the organisation from 
standard western think tanks, which lack the permanent field presence that forms a 
cornerstone of the „ICG methodology‟. Or as a former field-based ICG analyst puts it, 
stressing the importance of field presence in terms of symbolic capital:  
 
ICG presents itself as unlike “armchair” think tanks in DC and other Western capitals 
by way of its presence in “the field”. […] [T]his needs to be emphasized as it leads 
(policy) audiences to attribute (rightly or wrongly) much more authority to ICG‟s 
 9 
reports than to others‟. This way ICG‟s reports can be viewed as a tool in (western) 
foreign policy bureaucracies‟ internal debates and competition over conflicting policy 
views.
29
 
 
Permanent field presence is also claimed to make the ICG superior to reporting by 
traditional media outlets, which lack the means to deploy/contract journalists in crisis areas 
all over the world and especially to cover conflicts over an extended period of time.
30
  
With regard to high-level political contacts, the ICG profits from its staff‟s previous 
and/or subsequent jobs. The analysis of 74 LinkedIn profiles of former and current ICG staff 
revealed that 33 individuals working for the ICG had also worked for at least one other NGO, 
16 for an international organisation (predominantly UN bodies, but also NATO and OSCE), 
16 in the private sector, 14 in the media sector, and 12 for state institutions and agencies.
31
 
The job profiles suggest ICG staff‟s membership in broader professional networks of the 
western/international policy community that can be activated if needed. The other main 
channel of contacts is the ICG‟s already mentioned Board of Trustees, comprising a number 
of prominent former statespersons. 
In addition to, or despite of, its heavy reliance on its social capital, the ICG is also 
eager to stress its organisational „independence‟ and the „objectivity‟ of its reports. This is 
where the importance of cultural capital comes into the picture. Although emphasizing its 
own advocacy capacity, the organization distances itself from other advocacy organisations, 
especially explicitly norm-based NGOs like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty 
International.
32
 The ICG furthermore stresses the „expert‟ character of its staff and the 
„research‟ character of their field activities, thus making use of the cultural capital that 
dominates the field of academia. Unsurprisingly, ICG analysts usually have a university 
education. In addition, 22 out of the 74 ICG staff whose LinkedIn profiles were analysed for 
this research have also held professional positions in academia in the course of their career. 
At the same time, however, the ICG makes clear that its field-based research and analysis is 
better than that of academics, by being a „unique combination of field-based analysis, 
practical policy prescriptions and high-level advocacy‟, the latter two aspects of which are 
often lacking in politics-related academic knowledge production.
33
 
Some have argued that the sole concentration on human action and interaction in a 
social field is too narrow to fully explain its dynamics, and that technologies – in this case the 
ICG‟s different report formats – may also gain a sort of actor quality. In this sense, 
Kosmatopoulos (in this issue) argues with regard to the „crisis report‟ that, in order to explore 
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„the dialectics of enchantment of crisis experts‟, it is necessary to look „at the world of 
experts through the lens of techno-politics‟, because technologies and sovereign actors „stand 
in dialectic and intertwined relationship with each other, through which one might influence 
the other rather than having a unilateral direction of causality that emanates from humans and 
ends in their non-human products‟. Through such technologies – for instance, the „size, scale 
and sentinel‟ of the crisis report –, the „report presents itself as an assemblage of a series of 
technical characteristics that help to shrink the world at large and make it fit into the model 
format of the crisis expert‟, an effect on knowledge production that also needs to be 
accounted for.  
That the ICG is currently ranked among the world‟s top think tanks is not, however, 
predominantly a reflection of its „real‟ success in „working to prevent conflict worldwide‟ or 
some sort of „objective usefulness‟ of its reports to western/international policy circles. 
Rather, it testifies to the organisation‟s success in accumulating symbolic capital – above all 
expert authority – that differentiates it from similar organisations and elevates it in the 
perception of peers, policy-makers and public. Its field presence is a crucial aspect of the 
ICG‟s practices and image in this respect, as it makes the organisation stand out among its 
„armchair‟ competitors. 
The other major contribution to the ICG‟s symbolic value charging is its Board of 
Trustees. Although the role of most board members can hardly be called active,
34
 the 
impressive list of names and functions as such already lends importance to the organisation: 
the board comprises „two former prime ministers, two former presidents, eight former foreign 
ministers, one former European Commissioner, one Nobel Peace Prize winner and many 
other leaders from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media‟35. The board is 
predominantly (yet not exclusively) a male affair, with only one quarter female members. 
The age distribution further contributes to the impression of a „council of wise old men‟,36 
with the majority of members between 61-70 years old, followed by the 71-80 and 51-60 
years brackets. At the time of analysis, the youngest member was 43, the oldest, ICG co-
founder George Soros, 82. The board is also a „club of the wealthy‟: 28 members come from 
high-income OECD countries and only nine, seven and two members from high middle-
income, low middle-income and low-income countries respectively.
37
 Taken together, the 
board symbolises international power and influence, lending weight to the ICG‟s work.38 
While not part of the everyday workings, at times the role of the board can be more 
active and influential, as a former ICG researcher describes: 
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For one, the board members‟ interference and say in the reports is not even and clear-
cut, and in many cases does not materialize at all. Yet with regards to reports 
involving topics of high western policy concern […], there is such interference. The 
[country] report – to which I contributed – is a good (but exaggerated) example; its 
original draft argued against [a specific policy], after which the Board disagreed so 
strongly that the report was watered down, while inviting the reader to derive his/her 
own policy conclusions.
39
  
  
Reports without (or with only vague) policy recommendations for international action 
hint at strong disagreements among, and interference of, board members; tracing such reports 
may allow some insight into the internal power relationships between and among the 
organisation‟s staff and its directorate.40 
In addition to its field presence and its Board of Trustees, many ICG actions – from 
the type, amount and frequency of its information products and advocacy campaigns to the 
countries and political events covered and policy recommendations given – can be read as 
attempts to maintain or enhance its symbolic capital/expert authority. For instance, 
Hochmüller and Müller (in this issue) argue that the ICG‟s decision to cover the „drug war‟ in 
Mexico can be explained by the organisation‟s need to position itself in the international 
competition over policy knowledge.  
As shown, employing Bourdieu‟s field theory can help mapping the social field of 
conflict-related knowledge production and explain the accumulation of symbolic capital 
among a western (policy) audience.  
 
 
Between mediation and instrumentalisation: conflict experts in the ‘battlefield of ideas’  
 
A central question with regard to conflict-related knowledge production concerns the role of 
violence. The economic language of „knowledge markets‟, employed to describe competition 
over legitimate problem interpretations, resembles the debates of the late 1990s about wars as 
„markets of violence‟. Early promoters of the concept defined a market of violence as a 
conflict dominated by economic motives and material profits, contributing to the complexity-
reducing view of modern civil wars as driven by „greed and grievance‟ (cf. Bøås in this issue 
for a critique). The general observation, however, that violent actors are also economic 
players was also taken up by more nuanced works, which stressed the political causes of 
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violent conflict, while at the same time highlighting the role of economic factors in conflict 
dynamics. The literature specifically highlighted the ambiguous role of international actors 
such as humanitarian aid agencies, which while trying to alleviate the needs of populations in 
war zones simultaneously became part of violent actors‟ economic, war-prolonging 
calculations.
41
 
Analogously, it can be argued that knowledge experts are far from being the 
objective, outside observers with insider contacts that their self-description would want us 
believe. The ICG describes its field presence in terms, which imply the possibility of an 
independent outsider position for analysts looking at clearly identifiable problems: 
 
Our analysts are based in or near many of the world‟s trouble spots, where there is 
concern about the possible outbreak of conflict, its escalation or recurrence. Their 
main task is to find out what is happening and why. They identify the underlying 
political, social and economic factors creating conditions for conflict, as well as the 
more immediate causes of tension. They find the people who matter and discover what 
or who influences them.
42
 
 
From the perspective of ICG field analysts, the process of information gathering and 
report writing is more complicated, however, as they get entangled with their object of study: 
they become part of the political process, i.e. the battle of ideas organised around storylines 
that help actors with a wide range of interests to form discourse coalitions and establish a 
dominant reading of an event.
43
 A former field analyst describes how important her role of 
information gathering and report writing was for actors in a specific peace process and how 
she became both the target of other actors‟ versions of the story and a mediator between 
different stories:  
 
In the process, […] I was accused of being close to people on the whole spectrum – 
from the [ethnic] rebels to the president of [the country], the whole spectrum of 
positions. […] They instrumentalise. But at the same time they keep talking to me, 
because […] all the people appreciate the fact that I am faithful to it […]. You know, 
they got used to me, they got used to having a coffee or tea […], they got used to me 
hanging out in or close to the negotiation room. They knew also that I had access to 
the other side, to all sides, so every party would talk to me […], it was in their interest 
also to talk to me. […] What they would do when an ICG report came out was to look 
at the report itself and then see whether their names were quoted and in what way they 
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were quoted. […] And one of them said to me one time, it was an officer from the 
army, he said, “You know, so many times when I was at the officers‟ mess, I was 
talking to colleagues and I was saying how we need another report from [her] because 
we are really lost right now”.44 
 
For this analyst, the positive aspects of being an active part of the knowledge 
production process on the ground clearly outweigh the negative sides of being part of 
political power struggles about framings of conflict and peace. Accordingly, she comes to a 
positive assessment of her overall role in the conflict space: 
 
It was very gratifying, very gratifying to be part of something that at the end of the 
day went somewhere. […]. I had a small role in it […]. My reports made sense to [the 
people], they projected a certain analysis – right or wrong – of a process that for them 
was confusing […]. They themselves were transforming, this country was 
transforming; they could not always understand what their own politicians had 
decided to do. And they were all really scared [due to the violent history of the 
country and the violence in neighbouring countries]. From that point of view, just to 
see how this process of talking and discussing and negotiating – and then the 
circulation of information to which I contributed – how it demystified some of these 
issues and at the end of the day helped create an atmosphere that was more conducive 
to political settlement, I witnessed it and it was an incredible experience […].45 
 
There is no reason to doubt that experts‟ work can have positive effects on peace 
processes, although a detailed study would be needed to reconstruct in how far this specific 
analyst contributed to the peace process by reducing informational uncertainty and co-writing 
a shared story. 
The general perspective on knowledge as political power struggles introduced above, 
however, suggests that there is also another, less harmonious dimension to expert knowledge 
production. If struggles over knowledge determine which actors, claims and supporting 
narratives are seen as legitimate, then determining the process of knowledge production is 
likely to become the strategic goal of different actors involved. In the case of post-/conflict 
spaces
46
, this may include the definition of what is seen as legitimate violence – be it in the 
form of blaming, scapegoating or victimising certain actors, or be it by providing arguments 
for/against an external (military) intervention (cf. Bøås, Fisher and Koddenbrock in this 
issue). Knowledge production can thus have severe consequences for the balance of power 
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between groups of actors: rather than being a market, it can become a „battlefield of ideas‟ 
(Kostić in this issue), which may ultimately involve the threat or use of violence. And indeed, 
the analyst cited above received death threats, hinting at the importance that others attached 
to her role as knowledge producer (cf. also Grigat in this issue).  
These observations raise important questions regarding the role of informants and 
„stakeholders‟ in a post-/conflict space, who may well intend to steer or manipulate the 
process of knowledge production in their favour or for their purposes. Kostić (in this issue) 
points to the crucial role that knowledge experts‟ belonging to socio-political actor networks 
plays in this regard. His analysis of ICG reporting in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that 
 
the ICG‟s work in the early 2000s in BiH was seemingly part of a broader knowledge 
production flex-network united by a common effort of promoting the position of the 
US Department of State. It seems to have consisted of US military and intelligence 
representatives […], US diplomats […], and ICG Balkans director James Lyons. 
Combining access to privileged micro-level information, analysis and internal policy 
debates among internationals allowed the ICG-linked flexians to cut through the 
international bureaucracy and connect different levels of international policy-making. 
 
Kostić stresses the crucial necessity to account for the involvement of think tank 
experts in wider informal networks of collaboration and loyalty beyond their own 
organisation. These „flex networks‟ may encompass international organisations, 
governments, academia and the media, who use experts‟ services in a way that is reminiscent 
of the „revolving door‟ effect: the movement of personnel between politics and economy, 
which may be questionable depending on whether and how it is regulated by formal as well 
as informal rules, norms and institutions. Contacts and shifting roles allow for insider 
information and a position in which the expert can be instrumental in streamlining policies in 
favour of certain allies.  
Viewed in this way, the ICG staff‟s contacts not only constitute the basis for the 
organisation‟s political lobbying through access to policy-makers, but they actually represent 
a major power source for certain individuals to play a central part in the „battlefield of ideas‟. 
This renders the ICG‟s own image as „independent organisation‟ and coherent actor an 
illusion. It also means that its role and influence in a specific context may well change over 
time, based on the shifting composition of staff and their networks. Finally, it shows the 
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necessity to account for the many roles the reports and representatives of the organisation 
may play in different settings. 
 
 
Behind the logo: unpacking the ICG 
 
As the discussion has shown, there is an urgent need to „unpack‟ the ICG and analyse its 
workings and role on a micro- rather than a macro-level. The ICG is not a homogenous actor, 
and the question of how it produces its organisational brand, while at the same time being 
extremely heterogeneous in its role in specific contexts and at specific times, is but one of the 
puzzles that needs to be addressed.  
The heterogeneity of its role in specific cases can be attributed, first, to the fact that its 
working contexts differ quite considerably, explaining why ICG reports evoke a loud echo in 
some cases while withering unheard in others. In Indonesia, for example, the ICG is highly 
visible through its advocacy work and national media coverage; however, the group is rather 
a sound provider of argumentative support for human rights activists, whereas Indonesian 
policy-making seems to reflect its analysis and recommendations to a negligible degree.
47
 In 
West Africa, by contrast, ICG reports are not only widely read, but also carry the largest clout 
as compared to other knowledge producers. Next to policy-makers, academics read ICG 
analyses with considerable interest and make extensive use of them, even though at times 
they disagree with content, conclusions or recommendations.
48
 In the DR Congo, too, the 
ICG plays an important role alongside the United Nations Group of Experts, which publishes 
intelligence reports bi-annually. Asked about which sources of information they often refer 
to, Western UN or NGO staff unanimously referred to the ICG as the most or second-most 
important source.
49
 In Mexico, the ICG is a relative „newcomer‟ among transnational NGOs 
working on (in)security problems. However, already during its first year, it was successful in 
interviewing politicians from all major parties of the highly factionalized and conflictive 
Mexican party landscape and had a visible presence in leading national newspapers and 
magazines. Its relevance is likely to increase with the opening of its Mexico City field 
office.
50
 In Uganda, ICG reports have paid only limited attention to the on-going war against 
Joseph Kony‟s Lord‟s Resistance Army in recent years. An advocacy-driven offshoot of the 
ICG, however, the Enough Project, has rapidly become a major source of influence over 
Washington policy-makers and played a role in persuading the Obama administration to 
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dispatch 100 US military advisers to central Africa to assist regional forces in hunting down 
Kony.
51
  
A second dimension that needs unpacking concerns the relationship (and 
unquestioned dichotomy) between „the local‟ and „the global‟ in ICG expert knowledge 
production. By tendency, contributions in this issue focussing on report content come to the 
conclusion that ICG reporting plugs into, or is shaped by, dominant global discourses. 
Indeed, some of its reports cannot be explained but by an attempt to ride a wave, e.g. a short 
report series about Islam in Germany, France and the UK, which plugged into the „islamist 
threat‟ discourse accompanying the global war on terrorism (cf. Kosmatopoulos in this 
issue).
52
 Such reports may be trial and error processes but also show the organisation‟s high 
flexibility in adopting new themes – and letting them go if they do not evoke much 
resonance. Who takes the initiative in choosing a reporting topic or who engages in advocacy 
work within the ICG is not necessarily a matter of hierarchy or clear-cut roles, but depends 
on the conflict at hand and the individuals involved. As a former ICG analyst remembers 
regarding the role of ICG advocacy offices in western capitals: 
 
I – and many of my colleagues with ICG at the time – didn‟t take [ICG‟s advocacy 
managers based in Western capitals that „matter‟] very seriously unless a report that 
was supposed to be publicized was primarily directed at Western policy audiences. 
When that was not the case, I simply embarked on my own ad hoc „advocacy‟ policy 
directed at local audiences, in [the country] and the region as a whole, by approaching 
my network of contacts, writing in the local [language] press and sending around ICG 
reports.
53 
 
Third, as the contributions by Kostić, Fisher and Koddenbrock (in this issue) show, 
local power constellations (e.g. among the intervening agencies in Bosnia) or local agency 
(e.g. of the Ugandan and Congolese governments) should not be underestimated and need 
unpacking, too. An analytical focus on experts‟ social networks and recipient countries‟ 
governments and other national actors may, in some cases, well lead to other conclusions 
than a critical content analysis of ICG texts and their embedding into global discourses would 
allow. An important research task is thus to combine formal/informal network analysis with 
content analysis of expert reports and broader argumentative analysis around certain policy 
issues in order to understand the different dimensions of the process of knowledge production 
and the possible variety of messages and audiences. 
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Finally, analyses need to unpack shifts in the ICG‟s workings and influence over time. 
The most obvious shifts are those that can be traced back to personnel changes in the ICG 
Presidency, most notably the change from Gareth Evans (2000-2009) to Louise Arbour 
(2009-present). Not only the broad strategic focus has shifted since human rights expert 
Arbour took over; ICG staff also speak of a noticeable shift in internal leadership style.
54
 
Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and co-chair of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, which coined the Responsibility to Protect concept, is 
described as a micro-manager involved in internal discussion from the early stages of reports. 
Louise Arbour, by contrast, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Justice of the 
Canadian Supreme Court and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is known to be less hands-on and more consultative, 
involving senior advisors at the Brussels office in final decisions. The idea of informal 
networks of knowledge experts and other relevant actors discussed above furthermore hints at 
a possible role that changes of personnel may play for the ICG‟s field presence, as different 
staff members can be part of different networks, thus either enforcing or weakening the 
overall role played by the ICG in each case. 
 
 
Overstating impact? The ICG and global politics  
 
A final important question concerns the possible and actual impact of conflict knowledge 
producers on policy processes. The ICG claims that,  
 
Over the past eighteen years, Crisis Group‟s reports and the advocacy associated with 
them have had a significant direct impact on conflict prevention, management and 
resolution across the world. Crisis Group has been visible and effective in assisting 
policymakers determine how best to handle terrorism, nuclear proliferation, impunity 
for international crimes, trafficking in arms and drugs and other problems associated 
with fragile or conflict-prone states. Increasingly, high-level interlocutors tell Crisis 
Group that its work in support of international peace and security has become 
indispensable.
55
 
 
From the perspectives of knowledge production as competitive marketplace of ideas 
and contested social field, this „impact statement‟ is not surprising. Stressing an 
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organisation‟s effectiveness and impact is a crucial form of marketing, positively affecting 
donor contributions and future potentials of being heard as „expert‟, and „having impact‟ and 
being endorsed for it by people with names and titles is yet another component contributing 
to symbolic capital. The impact statements in the ICG‟s annual reports have to be read 
accordingly. In these reports, the organisation summarises its main activities in different 
countries and reflects on the impact they had on policy-makers and stakeholders. In the 2006 
annual report, for example, the ICG‟s impact on events in Kosovo were summarised as: 
 
In January, Crisis Group launched a fresh advocacy campaign focusing on resolving 
Kosovo‟s final status, releasing a major report, Kosovo: Toward Final Status. U.S. 
officials engaged with Crisis Group on alternative policy options, and statements by 
the Contact Group and the EU in April, ruling out partition and union with any other 
state, lifted text directly from the report‟s recommendations. […] The report had a 
tangible galvanising effect on the final status debate, with Belgrade reacting by 
recalibrating its position on the issue. The Contact Group‟s settlement parameters 
essentially reflect long-argued Crisis Group positions. […]56 
 
While it is not possible to say without further research whether the causal relations 
between ICG reporting and policy processes claimed here are correct, the way the group‟s 
„impact‟ is presented leaves many questions unanswered. Apart from the broad consensus in 
the social sciences that impact measurement is among the most daunting, if not impossible 
tasks, owing to the complex nature of social interactions and their direct/indirect, 
intended/unintended repercussions and effects, the impact narrative above lacks evidence for 
some claims. That an idea was „long-argued‟ by the ICG does not necessarily imply a causal 
relationship. Likewise, the text does not solve the „hen and egg‟ problem attached to ideas 
and conflict reporting: while ICG reports diffuse certain ideas through reporting, the ideas 
themselves are gathered through talking to those involved in a fluid process – leaving the 
question of „who invented them‟ open for interpretation. To some extent, the ICG has 
acknowledged this problem by regularly stating in its annual reports: 
 
Measuring the progress of an organisation such as ICG […] is inevitably an inexact 
science. Quantitative measures provide some sense of the level of activity of the 
organisation, and of others‟ response, but have their limitations. Qualitative 
judgements are necessarily subjective: it is difficult for anyone to establish a close 
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causal relationship between any given argument and outcome, particularly if the 
desired outcome is for something – here, conflict – not to happen.57 
 
It might be due to the missing links in the causal chains constructed in earlier impact 
statements that recent reports seem to be formulated more carefully, now only claiming that 
the ICG may determine through its reports and advocacy what policy-makers talk about, 
rather than claiming credit for the practical outcomes of these debates. In terms of influencing 
what policy-makers talk about, the ICG attributes its influence not least to sound and 
convincing arguments: 
 
All too often the missing ingredient is the “political will” to take the necessary action. 
Crisis Group‟s task is not to lament its absence but to work out how to mobilise it. 
That means persuading policy-makers directly or through others who influence them, 
not least the media. That in turn means having the right arguments: moral, political, 
legal and financial. And it means having the ability to effectively deploy those 
arguments, with people of the right credibility and capacity.
58
 
 
The emphasis on „the right arguments‟, however, is as compelling as it is misleading. 
As policy analysts of the „argumentative turn‟ have shown, arguments do not derive from 
facts or static positions; it is the argumentative interaction which forms discursive positions 
and discourse coalitions among a number of different actors who cluster around inter-
subjectively constructed and agreed, but rather vague storylines.
59
 This means that while the 
ICG can show that policy-makers and other actors pick up its reports, the organisation cannot 
influence how and for what ends the information, arguments and recommendations are used – 
a usage that might be quite contrary to the ICG‟s intentions. Focusing on the EU‟s use of 
expert knowledge, Boswell has shown, for instance, that expert knowledge can have three 
main functions. Next to the instrumental role of providing policy-makers with „facts‟, it may 
serve two symbolic purposes: 
 
The first of these is a legitimizing function. By being seen to draw on expert 
knowledge, an organization can enhance its legitimacy and bolster its claim to 
resources or jurisdiction over particular policy areas. In this sense knowledge can 
endow organizations with “epistemic authority”. The second is a substantiating 
function. Expert knowledge can lend authority to particular policy positions, helping 
to substantiate organizational preferences in cases of political contestation.
60
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Waldman‟s findings from a study of the use of statebuilding research by British 
policy-makers based in Afghanistan, Nepal and Sierra Leone confirm these functions. The 
interviewed policy-makers stated that they often use research selectively to justify certain 
programmes (substantiating function) and as „ammunition‟ in struggles within their own 
organisation or with other intervention agencies, as research „can add weight, credibility and 
persuasiveness to support a line on a specific issue‟ (legitimacy function).61  
 Studies should therefore also focus on the ways in which ICG expert knowledge is 
taken up and transformed by its recipients to fit their purposes. As the contributions to this 
issue show, the possibilities for impact range widely from negligible to instrumental, 
depending on the respective context – and this can only be analysed through in-depth case 
studies. What seems clear, however, is that it would be misleading to sweepingly take the 
ICG‟s self-description of its important role in international policy-making at face value and 
overestimate its influence. 
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